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I would like to begin by thanking Ron Chrisley for his interesting and detailed
commentary.1 There is much I find to agree with; indeed, it seems to me that his essay
can largely be read, not as a criticism of the perspective offered in my own article,2 but
rather as a useful and largely complementary alternate view. I am especially grateful for
the insights expressed in the last section of the paper, to wit:
(1) Embodied AI (EAI) can be understood, not just as a guide for building intelligent
systems, but as providing a set of concepts and approaches which enrich our
explanatory resources, thereby allowing us to better understand the systems we already
build, and
(2) if, as EAI holds, intelligence really is embodied, situated, and interactive in nature, then
perhaps we need to take seriously the notion that understanding and evaluating these
systems (and further developing the conceptual resources which will be necessary for
scientific advances in this area) is likewise going to be a matter of actually interacting
with them.
The first seems to me just right, while the second is extremely intriguing, and suggests
important implications that ought to be spelled out. Perhaps Chrisley will do this for us in
a later work; I would certainly welcome such a piece.
Still, there are a few places where we appear to disagree; some of these disagreements
are merely apparent, but one or two are genuine. I will discuss each in turn.
1. Representations and embodiment
In an example of the first, merely apparent, sort of disagreement, Chrisley suggests
that my (pragmatist) view of the meaning of symbols “seems to imply that if I act
E-mail address: anderson@cs.umd.edu (M.L. Anderson).
1
“Embodied artificial intelligence”, this issue [4].
2
“Embodied Cognition: A field guide”, this issue [1].
0004-3702/$ – see front matter  2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00056-0
152 M.L. Anderson / Artificial Intelligence 149 (2003) 151–156
inappropriately towards something, I ipso facto cannot be thinking about that something,
since appropriate behavior toward it is a requirement for representing it” [4, Section 4].
In defense of this interpretation, he cites my remarks to the effect that a commoner who
sat on the King’s throne must have misunderstood either the concept of “throne”, or that
of “chair”. I suppose the example is misleading in various ways (after all, the person
might understand these concepts perfectly well, and sit in the throne to make a subversive
statement about monarchy), but I meant it to emphasize two things:
(3) concepts have interrelations—hierarchical, inferential, and such—which matter to the
ways and contexts in which they are deployed, and
(4) a central role of concepts (reflected in their content) is in guiding behavior (this
in addition to—not ‘as opposed to’—organizing perceptual experience, although it
should be noted that for the Embodied Cognition (EC) theorist, the role of a concept
in organizing perceptual experience is best understood in terms of, or as a result of, its
role in guiding action).
I don’t see that these general observations, nor the specific remarks I make in “Embodied
Cognition” [1] commit me to a conceptual relativism on which “we could never be wrong”
because we will always “either have said something true about something else, or . . .
have said nothing at all” [4, Section 4], nor to a theory of intentionality on which acting
appropriately towards a thing is a condition of thinking about it. Chrisley has extrapolated
to (and is disagreeing with) a position which is neither one I in fact hold, nor one to which
an EC theorist is committed in virtue of accepting either or both of the points above. This
is why I suggest the disagreement is merely apparent.
Still, it may be worth saying a little more about the shape an embodied theory of
intentionality might take, and why such a theory wouldn’t necessarily be vulnerable to
criticisms of the sort Chrisley raises. To begin, we have to notice that there are two issues
at play here, which need to be teased apart: the conditions which govern the acquisition
of a concept (i.e., the same concept that the other members of one’s linguistic community
have) and the conditions which govern successful reference to (or the ability to think about)
some given object.
Acquiring a concept—say, “chair”, to stick with the familiar—is surely bound up with
more than just being able to reliably detect chairs in the environment. The conditions
for acquiring a particular concept may well involve putting it in the right inferential and
hierarchical relations to other concepts, including hooking it up in the right ways with
action and desire.3 If we saw someone who was surprised to see chairs with tables, or who
always sat on tables and ate off chairs, we might reasonably suspect that the person had
not, in fact, acquired one (or both) of the relevant concepts.
This, in combination with (4), above, does indeed suggest that a condition for having
acquired a concept might involve behaving appropriately; but it is better to say: behaving
in certain rationally explicable ways towards instances of the objects falling under
3 There are delicate issues here regarding how these conditions are treated. For the relevant debates about
conceptual holism see, e.g., [2,3,7].
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that concept. “Rationally explicable” will often (maybe even usually) be the same as
“appropriate”, but, as alluded to in the throne example above, not always. Evidence that
a child has acquired the concept “breakable” might equally be gently handling a given
vase (presumably what his parents hope) or smashing it on the ground (because watching
it break would be fun). The reduction of “rationally explicable” to “appropriate” depends
on the person in question sharing not just a conceptual repertoire, but also certain relevant
desires.
No doubt there are delicate issues waiting in the details of any such account, but
accepting the fact that exhibiting rationally explicable behavior might reasonably be a
consideration in determining whether someone has acquired (or is currently deploying)
a given concept (i.e., the same concept as the one you have in mind) surely commits one to
neither an unacceptable conceptual holism, nor a pernicious cognitive relativism. Further—
and this brings us to the separate issue of intentionality—none of this suggests that the
manifestation of appropriate behavior, however carefully it is defined, is a condition on
deploying the concept to successfully refer to or think about a given object.
For instance, although I myself believe that behavior is crucial to the ability to
establish and maintain intentional connections—to the ability, that is, to think about
individual objects [8]—the veridicality of those connections doesn’t depend on the
appropriateness of any behavioral interaction with the object(s) in question, but rather
on the (continuing possibility of ) behavioral interaction itself. Likewise, according to
the Guidance Theory of Representation (introduced in [9], and to be worked out in
detail in [10]) representational vehicles (such as concepts) are representational in virtue
of the fact that they standardly provide guidance for taking action with respect to the
entity represented.4 The representational connection is dependent on the guidance of the
behavior, not on the appropriateness of the behavior thereby guided—although, naturally,
in a properly functioning representational system, guidance and appropriate guidance will
generally coincide. Furthermore, on the Guidance Theory, representational error can be
cashed out in terms of (and discovered and corrected in virtue of) failure of action. This
notion that the world provides epistemic friction through the medium of action, sufficient
to limit, guide, and correct our representations, is the centerpiece of [8], and will be worked
out in much greater detail in [10].
4 Note this is not the same as making representation, reference, conceptual content, or grounding dependent
on (a history of ) causal interaction with the represented entity, as Chrisley suggests [4, Section 4], although of
course behavioral interaction and causal interaction go hand in hand in the normal case. But, as the Swamp Man
example shows (the Swamp Man example, for those who are not familiar, goes roughly like this: imagine an exact
duplicate of yourself forming by chance from a huge cloud of swamp gas. Will this being’s thoughts about, say,
Oxford University, actually be about Oxford University, as yours are? [5]) a history of actual causal or behavioral
interaction with an entity is not necessary to make a mental token representational (at least, it shows this if one
accepts, as I do, that except perhaps for some special cases Swamp Man’s mental repertoire supports genuine
intentional connections to the world). Rather, what makes a mental token representational is the fact that it would
be used by Swamp Man to guide his behavior towards the entity in question.
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2. Symbols and embodimentBecause Chrisley misconstrued the EC (or perhaps just my) view of the nature of
representation, the above is perhaps no more than a distraction, although I hope an
interesting one. Much more central to the topic of these essays—and a point of apparently
genuine contention between Chrisley and me—is Chrisley’s claim that I go wrong in
identifying the issue of grounding as the central, defining, and unifying theme of EC
research, for this “places an emphasis on representational content, as if EAI agreed with
GOFAI that is where the action is” [4, Section 4]. The easiest answer to this is to point
out (as Chrisley himself allows) that what I claimed is that EC is organized around the
physical grounding project, which is something much broader than symbol grounding.5
But Chrisley is right to notice that I seem to come back to symbols often, perhaps more
often than is seemly for someone committed to (explaining) the principles of EC.
The reason for this is simple: EC is committed, ultimately, to explaining human
intelligence, to discovering the underlying mechanisms of complex, intelligent behavior,
and I believe that this will not be possible in the end unless symbol use is part of that
explanation. Symbol use is far from the whole story; there is a great deal that goes into
intelligence, and some of what is now standardly explained in terms of the manipulation
of symbols will probably turn out instead to be rooted in the operations of specialized
sensory-motor systems. But the ability to use symbols—perhaps even the possession of a
language of thought [6] and the mental flexibility this implies—is going to turn out to be
a necessary part of the story, too. For an EC researcher who believes this (and surely I am
not the only one) what emerges as crucial (and fabulously interesting) is understanding the
relations between the lower level, older, specialized sensory-motor systems (of the sort by
which many EC researchers are rightly enthused) and the structure, elements, and rules
of operation of the more general, highly flexible, symbolic computational system we also
seem to possess. My bet, for what it’s worth, is that these are significantly intertwined, with
bi-directional feedback and cooperation—that, for instance, some conceptual contents can
be traced to specific sensory-motor systems, and some sensory-motor systems have been
adapted to utilize some of the resources of (or at least be responsive to) more general
conceptual systems. Section 3 of “Embodied Cognition” [1] is meant, in part, to outline
the kinds of explanations of intelligence (or its aspects) that result when one is attending
to these interrelations, and to suggest that explanations like these are characteristic of EC
and the physical grounding project.
3. Embodied symbols
The final point of disagreement between Chrisley and me, somewhat related to the
above, revolves around how to characterize the efforts by some researchers committed
to traditional AI paradigms to claim EC concerns and methods as their own. In order to do
5 Rather than replay my definition and discussion of the physical grounding project, I refer the reader to
“Embodied Cognition: A field guide”, especially Section 3 [1].
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this, I contend, they end up over-generalizing the term ‘symbol’ to cover all sorts of states:
conscious, unconscious, conceptual, non-conceptual, neural, spinal, cerebral and bodily.
I wrap up the relevant section by writing:
How will the various items in their grab-bag labeled ‘representations’ be related to one
another? How can a conscious, explicit representation encode information about or
from an unconscious, inexplicit one? Under what circumstances might such a relation
be needed? What does it mean for a representation—say, a motor representation of an
action—to be encoded in the body rather than in the head? [1, Section 5]
Chrisley rightly takes me to task:
One cannot simultaneously lambaste GOFAI for being Cartesian in that it maintains
a strong multiple-realisation thesis and an autonomy of the mental from the physical,
while simultaneously claiming that its Cognitivism assumes that the symbols of mental
processing are specifically cerebral, and not merely neural, bodily, or worldly. If. . .
their view is the one that implies that properly strung together beer cans can realize
thinking, then surely they have no strong claim as to what physical stuff underlies human
mentality. They certainly won’t be baffled by such questions as ‘What does it mean for a
representation. . . to be encoded in the body rather than in the head’. If one understands
how bodystuff in the head can instantiate or implement (“encode”) a representation, one
ipso facto understands how bodystuff not in the head might do so. [4, Section 5]
Of course, Chrisley is right: in the most general sense, it is easy to see how a
representation can be encoded by a (any) body. But let me use this opportunity to
emphasize that one of the problems that plagues discussion of these issues is inconsistency
in the use of such terms as ‘symbol’ and ‘representation’—inconsistency both between
different researchers, and by individual researchers. I am both guilty of, and a victim of,
such inconsistency here. In the discussion to which I was objecting, ‘representation’ was
being used interchangeably with ‘symbol’, but in the spirit of the physical symbol system
hypothesis, a symbol isn’t just any representation (anything that designates or denotes)
but canonically one that plays a very specific role, and is subject to a particular set of
transformations/operations. While it may still be easy to see how a (any) given body could
encode symbols in this sense, it seems clear that this is in fact the sort of thing that
happens only in the heads of only some bodies. The contribution to intelligent behavior
of these special bodies’ other parts (aspects)—and EC maintains that this contribution is
significant—will, and should, be difficult to characterize in terms of the physical symbol
system hypothesis, even when that contribution involves representation more generally,
but especially when it does not. Not everything is a physical symbol system (PSS), nor is
every part (or sub-part) of something which is a PSS itself a PSS. Likewise, and more to
the current point, I think it is misleading to suggest that every representation is a symbol,
and every system which employs representations is for that reason a PSS.
It is becoming ever clearer that not everything relevant to—nor even everything crucial
to—intelligent behavior is captured in the PSS hypothesis. The mind is in, and of, the
body, and this means far more than the simple fact that the mind is physically instantiated;
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the point instead is that mindedness is a property of whole organisms. This perspective—
which is, I think the better one—can help open us to a broad re-consideration of what,
in the organism, might constitute a contribution to its intelligence. ’Tis a consummation
devoutly to be wished.
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